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# Islamization in Pakistan: An overview

The paper attempts to investigate the process of implementation of Islamic laws in Pakistan from 1947 to July 1993. The introduction of Islamic provisions in various Pakistani constitutions to date was the outcome of persistent pressure for their inclusion exerted by a very prominent religious section of the society, namely the Ulema. However, the Islamic provisions included in various constitutions failed to satisfy any group in the society, whether the Ulema or others. It is quite obvious that during the period under discussion the state of Pakistan failed to achieve the rank of a modern Islamic state. This fact obviously raises the question whether the periodic experiments with Islamic provisions in various constitutions and their implementation was of any substantial benefit to the society. Therefore, it is of immense importance to indulge in an exercise of understanding what the ideology of Pakistan, as defined during the period of the Pakistan Movement, was and how it was understood, interpreted and implemented following the emergence of Pakistan. It is equally important to investigate why the state has failed to satisfy the proponent and proponent of the Islamization in Pakistan. The main thrust of this study is how, following the emergence of Pakistan, the orthodox Ulema endeavored to put themselves in the driver's seat regarding the correct interpretation(s) of what was the true ideological foundation, Islam, of the Pakistan Movement. This attempt on the Ulema's part was perceived to be at great variance by other influential groups of the society especially by many intellectuals, often trained on western lines, many professional historians et al. One of the primary arenas of contention was the interpretations of various aspects of Islam as put forth by Allama Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Ali Jinnah,

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considered, respectively, the main ideological and political leaders, of the Indian Muslims' struggle for Pakistan. Since these two leaders had departed from this world, AllamaIqbal in 1938 and Mr. Jinnah in 1948, in their absence a clash between varying group and personal interpretations about the true nature of what kind of an ideological state Pakistan was going to be following its emergence, was but natural. However, the tussle assumed forms which polarized groups of people along extreme lines and continues to this day. This study will be yet another, a fresher one, and hopefully, a new attempt to interpret the definition and of Islam, and interpretation of its various aspects, relevant to Pakistan from the history of the Pakistan Movement and the dialogues which have taken place since its emergence. The main sources of such an interpretation will remain the addresses, speeches, notes and other material which issued forth from the two main personalities AllamaIqbal and Mr. Jinnah. Therefore, this study will try to find a satisfactory answer to understand the factors behind such confusion about the utility of Islam in the modern times.<sup>5</sup>

However, the present study challenges the meanings and understanding of Islamization as visualized and appreciated by the traditional religious leadership, individually and collectively, under the umbrella of *Ulema*-led groups and Islam- based political parties.<sup>6</sup> The present study also challenges the significance and utility of the much demanded Islamic provisions embodied in various state-led but politically compromised constitutions. It even questions each and every step taken in the name of Islamizing this country. This study will also analyze whether the constitution making process of embodying Islamic provisions and their implementation gave any consideration to the actual religious heritage of the people of Pakistan and the promises and vision of the founding fathers of Pakistan or it simply ignored them. The present study is opposed to the viewpoints expressed by Clifford Geertz, Francis Robinson and other primordialists who think that nationalism directly emerges from cultural features. They also suggest that the emergence of Muslim separatism in India was the outcome of cultural incompatibility between Hindu and Muslim cultures.<sup>7</sup> The underlying hypothesis of the study is that the two leading founders of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>SurooshIrfani, "Pakistan: Reclaiming the Founding Moment" in Viewpoints Special Edition, *TheIslamization of Pakistan 1979-2009*(Washington), 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>AfzalIqbal, Islamization of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1986), 42-43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> C. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution -Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics In The New States" cited in C. Geertz (ed.), *Old societies and New States* (London: 1963), 128. Also see Francis Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims* (Cambridge: 1974)

Pakistan, AllamaIqbal and Quaid-i-Azam, put forth the vision of a modern Islamic state for Pakistan. However, after its emergence, the orthodox *Ulema* exerted relentless efforts to turn Pakistan into a theocratic state. This was done by including provisions to that effect in successive constitutions.

Islamization for the *Ulema* and their parties means<sup>8</sup> primarily the re-introduction of past institutions and practices with no substantive change, "For the majority of them [the Ulema/ the traditionalists], there was and is no question even of the interpretation of the classical Hanafi law, let alone of the Quran and the Sunnah, for modern times."9Islamization has been confined to the implementation of the laws of Sharia in their original form. So it is seen as a movement to make Islam a relevant source of power and social control that led even Clifford Geertz to view Islamization as "an effort to make Islam a universal, in theory standardized and essentially unchangeable and usually well integrated system of rituals and beliefs... not merely as a religion but a complete and comprehensive way of life."<sup>10</sup> The religious leadership seems to be medieval in its outlook and trained in only in classical interpretations of theology, Islamic history of the classical school as well and other old fashioned disciplines. The purely religious training has kept it isolated and intellectually estranged from the needs of the people. H.A.R. Gibb noted the same reality in these words, "It would be difficult to deny in the majority of Ulema a certain narrowness of outlook, an inability or even an unwillingness to realize the demands of the new life around them and to face the grave issues with which Muslim society is confronted."11These religious leaders are skillful in theological hair-splitting, competent in expounding the orthodoxies of their particular sects but less aware of modern movements and developments. A great many of them, while living on the blood and sweat of the common man in the name of religious

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> As noted in the findings of the court of enquiry constituted to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953. Interrogating a series of religious leaders including Maududi, it found that the *ulema* proved unable to agree among themselves as to what actually made a man a Muslim. The committee also examined in detail the views of *ulema* on the future constitution of Pakistan. The views speak of *ulema*'s perception of Islamization. See Government of the Punjab, Report of the inquiry constituted under Punjab Act 11 of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953.*Munir Report*, Lahore, 1954.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>.FazlurRahman, "Currents of Religious thought in Pakistan" *Islamic Studies*, Vol. VII, No. 1(1968): 3.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Clifford Geertz, Islam observed: Religious Developments in Morocco and Indonesia(Chicago: 1971), 14. For a General discussion on the subject see H.A.R Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey (New York: 1966), Chapter No.6.
<sup>11</sup> H.A.R. Gibb Islam: A Historical Survey(London: 1978), 129-130.

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guidance as peripatetic religious teachers remain involved in fighting religious war against their counterparts of other schools of religious thought. They are literalist in approach and concerned with the letter of the law and take great pains to emphasize the total self-sufficiency and comprehensiveness of Islam. They think that it is only they who can give the right lead to the people forgetting that the majority Muslims in the areas that form today's Pakistan follow the century's old spiritual teachings of the mystics and believes in the non-violent and equality-based version of Islam.<sup>12</sup> Even the approach of reformers towards this phenomenon has been made 'predominantly traditional in orientation' mainly because of the traditionalist background of majority of religious leaders, a fact which is recognized by John L. Esposito<sup>13</sup>.

Allama Muhammad Iqbal, the intellectual formulator of Pakistan expected Islam to deliver social justice based on humanitarian approach. He wanted that Islamic ideology should be interpreted, formulated and presented as liberal and dynamic rather than conservative and static - a fact which should be well known to those who have read his sixth lecture entitled "The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam<sup>14</sup>. He attacked the *Ulema's* commitment to the principle of Taqlid (doctrinal conformity) which he argued had ossified Islam and made it remote from the realities of the contemporary world. Taglid, he believed, was the root cause of the present decline of Muslims. To revitalize Muslim society, ijtihad had to be reinstated through ijma (consensus of the community). He argued further that "the transfer of *ijtihad* from individual representatives of schools to a legislative assembly.... Is the only possible form *ijma* can take in modern times." Furthermore referring to provisions of the Persian constitution of 1906 he repudiated as "dangerous" the idea of giving the Ulema power to supervise legislative activity.<sup>15</sup>

The Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the political founder of Pakistan also wanted the implementation of egalitarian aspects of Islam. "Thirteen hundred years ago, he (*Prophet Muhammad*) laid the foundations of democracy... It (*Islam*) is based on the highest principles of honor, integrity, fair play and justice for all...

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> C. Geertz, "the integrative revolution -primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states" cited in C. Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States*(London: 1963),128. Also see Francis Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Musipol*(Cambridge: 1974).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path* (New York: 1994),212.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religion Thought in Islam* (Lahore: 1971), 146–180.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Quoted fromIbid., 173 – 174.

in Islam there is no difference between man and woman. The qualities of equality, liberty and fraternity are the fundamental principles of Islam<sup>16</sup>. He did not see any dichotomy between Islam and a modern democratic state believing that a state that pursued policies conducive to the prosperity and moral health of its citizens was certainly Islamic. In fact the sort of Islam that he put forward was simple and straightforward, free of all theological and doctrinal subtleties and something which the ordinary Muslim masses could understand. This had a very strong appeal for the Muslim masses with an unmatched response from them.<sup>17</sup>

Some serious thought should also be given to the peoples' understanding of Islamization. Trained in centuries-old Sufi traditions of tolerance and equality they take Islamization in a different manner and have always voted for leadership that promises them formulation of progressive state policies in order to introduce Islamic egalitarianism in a contemporary setting. The dominant majority of Pakistan is peaceloving and believes in the kind of Islamization that gives them their promised rights and keeps their society united and protects the Islamic traditions of equality, tolerance, love and devotion for their spiritual ancestors and their shrines.

The aspirations of the people of Pakistan keeping in view their South Asian religious heritage and the promises made to them by the founding fathers of Pakistan must be given priority in defining the parameters of Islamization which implies by giving a dynamic and progressive interpretation to Islam for the uplift of the oppressed masses.<sup>18</sup> It means the development of institutions and programs that liberalize Islamic thought and diffuse its egalitarian principals in view of modern changes. It also means the promotion of spiritual, peaceful and tolerant image of Islam with a reflection of integrity, honesty,

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Address to the Bar Association in Karachi on January 25, 1948 cited in JavedIqbal, *The Legacy of Quaid-i-Azam*(Karachi: 1967), 22-23.
<sup>17</sup> Address to civil, Naval, Military and Air Force Officers of the Pakistan Government,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Address to civil, Naval, Military and Air Force Officers of the Pakistan Government, Karachi October 11, 1947, quoted from Zulfiqar, *Pakistan as Visualized by Iqbal & Jinnah*, 225.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Tarek Fatah minutely but beautifully hints upon this difference between the "peaceful, spiritual, and deeply respectful" of the "other" version of South Asian Islam Islam that relied on the Quranic expression, "to you your religion, to me mine" and the Islam that he describes as, "militant stream of Puritanism".Tarek Fatah, *Pakistan Chasing a Mirage: Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State*(Lahore:Vanguard, 2011), 18-19. [Islamization in Pakistan has promoted the latter version contrary to the religious heritage and the commitment of the founding fathers for the former

transparency and nobility of Muslim character.<sup>19</sup> It stands for a commitment to the protection of rights, quality and compulsory education under a unified state system, reasonable access to justice, health services, poverty alleviation, equal opportunities, and promotion of merit-based policies, environmental protection and respect for humanity irrespective of religion. The prime objective of Islamization is the establishment of an ideal society that fulfills the basic needs of its every segment. The imposition of punishments comes after the attainment of this objective and is meant to avoid mischief, disorder and crimes through psychological means with execution as a last resort.

The Muslim masses of India supported the creation of Pakistan but very soon after independence it became clear to them that the ruling class lacked any economic and social programs in order to protect their economic interests. This was due to the fact that the interests of the ruling class were deeply rooted in feudalism and a budding capitalist economy. The Ulema on the other hand found lack of enthusiasm in the society for a theocratic state and they realized that the people of Pakistan were not ready for any such movement under their leadership because they did not trust them and did not accept their narrow and dividing views on Islam. The people mostly respected and followed the Sufi traditions and the Sufi doctrines which taught them the lessons of unity, equality, tolerance and peace. So the Ulema and their parties kept themselves aloof from this mainstream thought and began to concentrate in the area of constitution-making through ideological inroads, politics of agitation and protection of the status quo and their own vested interests. These Ulema realized that the ruling elite were willing to compromise on the well-being of the state and betterment of the masses. Both sides brought their compromised statement of objectives named as Objective Resolution which spoke differently to different people and laid the foundation for the implementation of Ulema-based Islamization that continues even today in Pakistan through various constitutions and constitutional amendments and has provided set back to the ideology of Islam. It has left the society divided on religious and sectarian basis and between

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> For the disconcerting and mixed results of capitalism which has been protected and promoted by Islamization throughout country's history and which has provided motivation for further similar type of Islamization due to the failure of emerging social order in society. Mustapha Kamal Pasha, "Islamization, civil society, and the politics of transition in Pakistan" in Douglas Allen, (ed.) *Religion and Political Conflict in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka* (Landon:2004),122-125.



rich and poor<sup>20</sup>. It has created more conflict and questions than unity and harmony.

The history of Pakistan shows that the imposition by the state of selective religious ideology of the few by ignoring the religious views of the huge majority has created religious discrimination. Moreover it has put the socio-economic institutions under the control of the upper classes. Focus upon rituals has relegated realities of social inequality, etc., to a lower rank. Creation of an attitude of 'religiosity', 'a sentimental emotionalism', 'a religiously correct mind', a 'pure' idea, in isolation from social and economic realities, has diverted attention from real issues. This stress on religiosity to the exclusion of humanitarian services of Islam as believed by the people has strengthened power of the ruling classes. Further the politicization of religion has added to the confusion and exploitation of the poor masses. It has also increased corruption to levels never seen before. External displays of religiosity have created a defense mechanism through which its practitioners, mostly feudalists and capitalists or their cronies, are able to hide behind it. Misuse of religion has provided means of concealment or justification for any misdeeds, moral ineptitude, individual and collective inefficiency, and irresponsible actions, including even murder, of those innocent people who dare to stand up to it. The ideology of Pakistan as comprehended by the people of Pakistan and as understood by the leadership that established, Pakistan has been pushed aside. The true message of Islam has been misinterpreted to deprive the people of its real blessings and a facade of false Islamization has been erected to shelter the corrupt, the inefficient, the exploiters and even the killers. Here lies the real problem.

This approach is a direct outgrowth of the two-nation theory which formed the basis of the struggle for Pakistan. However, it is argued in this study that the two-nation theory basically took shape when the Muslims of northern India considered that their socioeconomic interests were endangered by Hindu domination of major spheres of life throughout the country. This group then tried to popularize itself and attempted to create a base amongst the Muslims in India through a political organization. The purpose was not to establish

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> For the disconcerting and mixed results of capitalism which has been protected and promoted by Islamization throughout country's history and which has provided motivation for further similar type of Islamization due to the failure of emerging social order in society. Mustapha Kamal Pasha, *Islamization, Civil Society, And The Politics Of Transition in Pakistan.* Ibid.,122-125.

a theocratic state and the decision to organize Muslim League was not a religious act.<sup>21</sup> It was in fact a movement in which diverse Muslim groups from different regions of India, representing different social strata and interests were allied under the flag of Muslim League in pursuit of their material objectives.

These Muslims were the descendants of those who had practiced the grand devotional, tolerant and loving mystical traditions of Islam. In modern times they saw in Jinnah a promised savior who would bring for them the fruits of social and economic egalitarianism of Islam which they felt was threatened by the politics of religious leadership working under the philosophy of composite nationalism of the All India Congress. So the dominant theme of the Pakistan movement was not based on religious and cultural differences but protection of the rights and opportunities of Muslims. Moreover the objective was not to be achieved through a body of doctrines, dogmas, laws and rituals later on called as Islamization by the traditional religious leaders and *Ulema*but through the practice of the highly cherished ideas and the pristine principles of Islam by the moderninclined Muslim leadership.

Society in Pakistan is unique in its Islamic character. A blend of the indigenous, the Arab, the Turkish and the Persian elements has made it different from other Muslim societies. Islam has been developed here over many centuries by the mystics who popularized it and made it different from the classical Arab Islam. Their Khanqahsexisted and flourished parallel to that of state institutions and enhanced the socio-religious as well as the socio-economic values of Islam. The *sufi* poets further increased its base of popularity through use of local languages. Through such means the humanitarian role of Islam began to press its adherents as well as to the neglected and deprived sections of society irrespective of considerations of religion, caste or class. The founding fathers of Pakistan had, therefore, stressed that Islamic ideology embodied a similar sense of social justice and was to function as a foundation for the welfare of the masses. It was promised to the people that Islam would work as a liberating and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Practically every Muslim group and organization in the Indian subcontinent that later on stood for its own narrow, intolerant and form based Islamization in Pakistan was hostile to Jinnah and the Muslim League and had strongly opposed the Pakistan movement. A great deal of effort was, however, devoted by Muslim League leaders to winning. Eventually they succeeded in doing so, but only partially, and only when the creation of Pakistan has been just over the horizon.

progressive force which would bring them unity, equality, freedom, peace and prosperity.

Letters written by AllamaIqbal to Jinnah depict Muslim economic problem as the most important one. To him the "problem of bread was becoming more and more acute" and Muslims were "going down and down during the last 200 years".<sup>22</sup> He believed that "Indian Islam" that has worked in this part of the world as "a people-building force" could solve their problems through a separate political entity.<sup>23</sup>Iqbal considered that this could only be achieved through a modern, educated, enlightened and progressive leadership so that the spirit of this Indian Islam could be implemented through modern means of democracy. For this purpose he convinced Mr. Jinnah to lead the Muslims, "you are the only Muslim in India today whom the community has the right to lookup for the safe guidance through the storm which is coming to north-west India and perhaps to the whole India".<sup>24</sup> This makes it clear that Iqbal did not consider traditional religious leadership capable of leading the Muslims nor were the religious differences with the Hindus sufficient in themselves to motivate Muslims and their leadership for parting of the ways with them.

Consequently the Muslims of India began to see in Jinnah a leader who would make possible for them to have the implementation of egalitarian principles of Islam in a separate state through modern democratic ways. The Muslim masses looked towards a modern political leadership and ignored the traditional religious leadership. Moreover the Muslims could not trust these *Ulema* because what the *Ulema* preached was quite different from the religious teachings of their spiritual leaders. The *Ulema* believed in the working of medieval

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Allama Muhammad Iqbal*The Reconstruction of Religion thought in Islam*(Lahore: 1971), 146-180.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> According to Iqbal, to accept Islam is to accept certain Legal concepts. These concepts – revelatory but not to be belittled for that reason – have 'civic significance'. 'The religious order of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India.' Presidential address of Allama Muhammad Iqbal delivered at the annual session of AIML Allahabad 29 December1930. cited in. G.H. Zulfiqar, *Pakistan as visualized by Iqbal&Jinnah* (Lahore, n.d.), 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Letter from Allama Muhammad Iqbal to Muhammad Ali Jinnah dated Lahore May 28, 1937.

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institutions in their purity whereas the Muslims of India did not consider this form as compatible with their lifestyle. The Muslim masses concentrated upon that true spirit of Islam which was displayed in Islam preached by the *Sufis* in India. It was in 1947, for instance, very shortly after independence, that Mr. Jinnah ensured this reality and said: "the idea was that we should have a state in which we could live and breathe as free men and which we could develop according to our own light and culture and where the principles of Islamic Social Justice could find free play".<sup>25</sup>

But after Jinnah's death, the same religious leaders who had opposed the creation of the country aspired to become its guardians and began to create hurdles in the formulation of a modern constitution for the country under the pretext of Islamizing the newly-born state. Men like said Ramadan, Muhammad Asad, MaulanaMaududi and many others like them took upon themselves the task of defining the 'Islamic' parameters of the proposed constitution and began to demand what was contrary to the wishes of the people of Pakistan. The ideas of Igbal and commitments of Jinnah were ignored. An attempt was made to push Pakistan towards accepting the narrow and closed interpretations of Islam. It was like pushing Muslims back towards the dark ages. Wael B. Hallaq fails to understand this aspect of ignorance of the religious leadership. He equates this to the commitment and vision of the founding fathers of Pakistan and the role of Indian Islam. The outlook of the politically motivated traditional religious leadership was nothing but medieval and differed strongly from the vision of Islam as expressed by Iqbal, Jinnah and others like them.<sup>26</sup> Zia-ul-haq and others like him should not ignore the centuries-old humanitarian role of Islam in India and the modern leadership that has always been given preference over the traditional religious leadership by the people of Pakistan.<sup>27</sup>

Following the emergence of Pakistan the rapprochement between the Muslim League leadership and the *Ulema*-led parties resulted in the incorporation Objectives Resolution as the goal of any future constitutional development in Pakistan. The passage of this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Address to the Bar Association in Karachi on January 25, 1948 cited in JavedIqbal, *The Legacy of Quaid-i-Azam*(Karachi: 1967), 22-23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Address to civil, Naval, Military and Air Force Officers of the Pakistan Government, Karachi October 11, 1947, quoted from Zulfiqar, *Pakistan as Visualized by Iqbal& Jinnah*, 225.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Pakistan publications, *Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-1948* (Karachi:n.d.), 60.

Resolution has had very negative effects for political progress in Pakistan and, consequently, for its people. One of the negative effects has been series of cosmetic measures at Islamization which simply exploited the religious sentiments of the people without achieving any practical gains for them.

The Objectives Resolution of 1949 was open to varying interpretations as per Ulema's wishes at different times and by different groups amongst them.<sup>28</sup> The compromises made by the politicians with the Ulema in the early years of Pakistan's political life encouraged the latter to such an extent that they began to very actively aspire for participation in the business of governance of the state. It paved the way for further eclectic compromises in the first Constitution of Pakistan in 1956. The people of Pakistan were watching these developments quietly awaiting their turn to render their verdict in the country's first national elections scheduled for March 1959. The elections were expected to be won by the NAP-led Pakistan's leftist parties supported by the trade unions. This coalition had promised withdrawal of Pakistan from all US military pacts. The victory was also expected to expose the standing of so-called Islamic parties. The United States also felt its strategic interests endangered in view of such expected results. The capitalist class was also worried. This convergence of interests brought the United States, Pakistan, the capitalist classes and the Islamists on one platform and resulted in an army coup on October 7, 1958. Pakistan's march towards peace, progress, prosperity and integrity was halted in its tracks. Henceforth the religious and the military establishments assumed a much greater role in the affairs of the country and the role of the Sufi khangahs and shrines--which were considered centers of peace and tranquility in the country--were relegated into the background. Along with this development march of the country towards modernism and the broader interests of the people were blocked.

During the next decade the East Pakistanis waged a successful struggle against the central establishment, compromising mostly of the military-mullah alliance, centered in Islamabad, for their rights, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> During its seven years of existence it convened 16 constitution making and 13 legislative sessions with an average attendance ranging from 37 to 56. This meant that only 29 members at a time could alter the whole structure of the state. Some either resigned or were unable to attend its sessions for long periods. Some members held seats simultaneously in the Provincial Assembly as well as the CAP, because there was no ban on it. ZarinaSalamat, *Pakistan 1947 – 1958: An Historical Review*(Islamabad: 1992),48.



were able to secure their independence eventually in 1971. Edward Mortimer's perception about the positive effects of Ayub Khan's modernistic approach to Islam proved wrong as his Islamization failed to provide equal rights and keep Pakistan united.<sup>29</sup> Ayub Khan's regime's failure at implementation of Islamization was a failure in understanding the real basics of a religion and failure of the policies of his inner circle and close advisors. The separation of East Pakistan was also a defeat of the antidemocratic forces and the ruling elites of Pakistan who had always ignored and often compromised the aspirations of the people in the name of their self-styled Islamization.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's populist slogan of "Islam, Democracy and Socialism" that gave him a landslide win in Pakistan's first general election held in 1970 also reflected the eclectic spirit of Pakistan's South Asian Muslim identity.<sup>30</sup> Very soon, however, a movement of agitation, led by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), was launched against the Bhutto regime. This movement once again comprised of the same feudal, capitalist and mullah-led interests supported by the USbacked military in order to overthrow his government and shatter the dreams of the country's founding fathers of prosperity for the peaceloving people of Pakistan. Zulfigar Ali Bhutto committed a grave mistake for his lack of attention towards developing me Islamic ideology as a progressive force to meet the demands of modern times.<sup>3</sup> The society lacked intellectuals, organizations and those groups of people who could defend his polices as the PNA movement gradually kept increasing its pressure on him by using Islam as a political weapon. Consequently, as the movement gathered momentum, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto began to surrender before the extremists and exploiters as is evident in a series of measures that he took to Islamize Pakistan but this compromising stance adopted at the cost of peoples' popular stance failed to save his government.<sup>32</sup> Eventually he was toppled by General

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Edward Mortimer, Faith & Power: The Politics of Islam (New York: 1982), 211.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, *The Politics of the JamiatUlema-i-Islam Pakistan 1971-*77(Karachi: OUP, 2000), 22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan (ed.), Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Awakening the People: A Collection of Articles, Statements and Speeches 1966-1969(Rawalpindi:n.d.), 53.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Those who emphasized merely upon the outward form of Islam again got an opportunity (Like post partition years) to aggressively promote the powerful Islamic current generated in the aftermath of Bangladesh. On the face of stiff opposition from the two socialistically oriented parties, the National Awami Party of Wali Khan and the Jamiyat-ul-Ulema of Hazarvi Mr. Bhutto felt it easier to compromise with his ideological opponents – the moribund rightists.

Zia ulHaq in a military coup in 1977 and praised the PNA movement for the 'spirit of Islam' which had inspired it.

The military in collaboration with some religion-based parties once again violated the sanctity of the ballot and of the constitution of Pakistan on the pretext of Islamizing it. Again the promises of the founding fathers of Pakistan were ignored in the name of self-created vision of 'Islam' but religion-based political parties and the *Ulema*were pleased by Bhutto's forced downfall. These parties and their leaders had been by the people earlier in the elections but they were successful in penetrating the corridors of power with their sectarian biases and through that were able to influence the course of events that followed.

Under Bhutto's successor, again a military man, General Zia ulHaq, Pakistan was set on a different track. Lacking a political or social base of his own other than the army, Zia carved out a constituency through a Saudi-backed policy of Islamization. This policy infused Islamic conservatism in the state and society and those religio-political parties that had historically stood in opposition to Jinnah and Pakistan. The welfare of the people was again relegated to secondary importance as the country was again pushed towards extremism, leading to an increase in poverty and illiteracy. The courts of justice continued to function but failed to provide any justice. As the people of Pakistan did not accept rigidity and militancy due to their centuries-old religious traditions, the objective of *jihad* and implementation of politically- motivated Islamization was achieved through a proliferation of *Madaris* with supported by Wahabi and *deobandi*doctrines and foreign fighters.

When civilian Government did return to Pakistan after Zia's death in a still-unexplained plane crash, a sort of democracy, seemed to have made an appearance again in Pakistan but the country was really struggling through one civilian regime followed by another. In the eleven years that followed the army was again, looking over the shoulders of its leaders, in this case Benazir Bhutto, (late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's daughter,) and Nawaz Sharif, member of a Punjabi business family whom the army establishment had pushed into politics), the two most important civilian politicians of the decade of democracy. Although both acted as mainstream civilian leaders but neither could challenge the consensus that had grown up around the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic state. Between these two, Benazir Bhutto compromised cautiously while Nawaz Sharif did so openly and proudly. Both ignored economic betterment of the people, failed to introduce the required

judicial reforms and a comprehensive education policy for the masses. The parallel system of education in *Madaris* went on flourishing. Sectarian violence now commenced and began to assume the shape of international terrorism and the sectarian parties began their entry into the corridors of power and in the parliament. The civilian governments simply welcomed them and appeased them through Islamization, putting the very existence of social cohesion and survival of the state and society at grave risk.

These periodic phases of politically-motivated and *Ulema*defined Islamization have proved dangerous for Pakistan. It has deprived the people of the fruits of independence. It has proved harmful for the true image of Islam and has promoted its image that is contrary to the centuries-old humanitarian role of the Islamic religious leaders of this part of the world. This process has brought Islamization closer to *talibanization*. Its focus upon form resulted in real negation of the spirit of Islam and was the main cause of the dismemberment of Pakistan. It has pushed the state and society of Pakistan to the verge of collapse. Poverty and illiteracy continue to hide behind the façade of Islamization. Forces of extremism have strengthened and have assumed the form of international terrorism.

Under Zia Islamization promoted a system of education that produced millions of *talibs* every year with narrow vision and rigid attitudes. They have been sympathizers of extremism and violence and supported religious and sectarian divides. They preach their views in families, neighbors, market places where the work, in institutions where they serve, by knocking at doors and from the pulpit. They have been successful at creating sympathizers from within various groups of the society at large, sometimes in the name of *jihad* and at other times in the name of sectarian activities. The poor people of Pakistan are given little consideration even in giving donations which are preferably given to the militant organizations and *Madaris*on advice from the pulpit. <sup>33</sup>

If the founding moment of indo-Persian culture was rooted in the 11<sup>th</sup> century publication of *KashfulMahjub*[the unveiling of the hidden], a treatise on Sufism by Lahore's patron saint, Ali UthmanHujwiri (d.1077), <sup>34</sup>the publication in Peshawar of al-Suri's, *The experience and lessons of the Islamic jihadi Revolution* in 1991

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup>For detail see: Anita M. Weiss, (ed.), *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan*(Lahore: Vanguard, 1987).

vanguard, 1987)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> It triggered a cultural efflorescence in Indian art, architecture, literature and music.

seems stand nowhere contrary to the fear of SurooshIrfani that it "might well have signaled the internalization of an Arabist shift in Pakistan".<sup>35</sup> Therefore, it is time to repudiate this narrow version of Islam which is presented on and off as Islamization. It is time to stop the use of Islamization as a political weapon. It has given nothing to the people of Pakistan. It's time to respect the religious heritage of the people of Pakistan. The state must stop appeasement of the religious leadership. It must let the democratic process function with complete independence and honor the verdict of people who have always rejected the preachers of hate, promoters of violence, and instigators of social divide and supporters of economic exploitation.

However, the above-mentioned school of thought was taken over by "Form" based on Arabic ways of Islam. It was rigid and fundamental in approach and presented by Ulemas of the time. These Ulemas, who were medieval in their outlook, solely focused on Arabic culture, language and traditions and pronounced them as the actual Islamic ways. They contradicted the prevailing socio-religious paradigm of the area. Islam was presented as a religion of punishments and agitation politics. The Islamic practices and not the spirit behind these rituals was presented as the real form of it whereas the people's perceptions, culture, history, art and even the indigenous values were never accounted for. After the independence of Pakistan, it was the most unfortunate event to unfold that reshaped the religious thought in our society. Moreover, the state used this specific brand of Islam for its political purposes in connivance with the landlords and the industrialists. The short-sightedness of initially the military dictators and afterwards even the civilian rulers to impart such a hard-line approach changed the ideological landscape of this society.

Another factor that outlined the differences between these ideologies was the economic ideologue. The Sufi approach was to build a coherent society that would eventually contribute indiscriminately towards social welfare and economic uplift of the masses. These principles were rejected by the later faction on account of socialist and communist ideologies and they promulgated themselves on account of religious defenses based upon separatist attitudes.

In this research, weight has been put behind the earlier traditional Sufi approach in which the religion appreciated the indigenous cultural values of the people of India. Furthermore, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup>SurooshIrfani, "Pakistan: Reclaiming the Founding Moment" in Viewpoints Special Edition, *TheIslamization of Pakistan 1979-2009*(Washington: DC), 16.

Indian Muslim leadership including Jinnah, Muhammad Iqbal as well the Aligarh movement was entirely based upon western outlook and ideas. The reason being the inbuilt enlightened and reformatory approach of the Sufis was in consonance with the modern world. On the contrary, the *Madrassa* culture could never create its roots in the common man of pre- and post-partition era. However, we find little research on this subject by modern historians and scholars. It would be discussed how the issue was put on the backburner by the ruling groups of this country right from the outset.

After Jinnah, various leaders came up with their own novel ideas of reforming Islam. Ayub Khan introduced 'modern' Islam, whereas Bhutto came up with his version of a 'socialist' Islam. Not forgetting the 'classical' Islam of Zia we would also gaze upon the 'compromising' Islam of Benazir Bhutto and the 'capitalist' version of Islam introduced by Nawaz Sharif. During all this the top brass leadership forgot to understand that they never needed any reformation in Islam as it had already been reformed and enlightened by the Sufis many centuries ago. The fault lines occurred when the leadership failed to grasp the nerve center of the problem. Although it was a deliberate failure on the part of the state to read the social pulse, it was also a conscious effort on their part to introduce the *mullah* version of Islam for their political gains that resulted in major decimation of the socio-religious fabric of our society.

# Conclusion

The principles of Islam had inspired the Muslims of India to strive for their rights in a new state. For this purpose they decided to follow the modern, educated and enlightened leadership and rejected the traditional religious leadership. The purpose was to adopt modern techniques, methods and institutions for the attainment of the spirit of their faith. Moreover it was clearly understood that Islamic ideology will be reinterpreted in the light of modern times and the form, character and role of Islamic institutions will be redefined in an environment of independence for the betterment of the Muslims living in this new state. The historical and humanitarian role of Islam in subcontinent had inspired Muslims to remain peaceful during their struggle and stay away from the traditional religious leadership that first of all was not interested in their socio-economic and political issues, and secondly, always desired to implement the medieval institutions in their original form resulting in exploitation along with religious and sectarian divides. The Muslims of India therefore

followed Iqbal and Jinnah whose promises and vision for the new state revolved around the dynamic and progressive reinterpretation of Islamic ideology for the socio-economic uplift of the oppressed masses. The Islamic ideology was never ever to be made a closed, dogmatic and politically expedient code in the hands of the ruling elite. But the Ulema defined Islamization and its use as a political weapon and put the country on a different track with serious consequences. Unfortunately, both the civil and military rulers continued the use of Islamization as a political weapon and went on ignoring the people of Pakistan. Moreover, the QisasandDiyat Laws, the Blasphemy Laws, violence against women and minorities, state of *deeniMadaris* and the declining educational standards, the *jihadist* culture<sup>36</sup> and the journey from sectarian strife to international terrorism<sup>37</sup> have been the some repercussions of Islamization in Pakistan. Therefore, halfhearted attempts to implement some of the Quranic injunctions were made which, however, failed to satisfy none of the main parties or groups like the Ulema or the common educated man, involved. As a result, the common people began to believe that since the country was founded on the appeal of Islam to the Muslims of India, lack of its full implementation was the root-cause of all ills in the society.

In short, we have come to the point where the hardliners are having a heyday and the message of *Sufis that* was based upon love, compassion, tolerance and peaceful coexistence has been depleted considerably. Therefore, the revival of message of *Sufis* can bring tolerance, peace and compassion in the increasingly disintegrating society of today's Pakistan.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> For detail see: Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond*(Landon: I.B. Tauris, 2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>DilipHiro, WarWithoutEnd:The Rise of Islamists Terrorism and Global Response (London: Rutledge, 2002).

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